We provide an empirical investigation of the channels via which the legal quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) affects banking sector performance through its impact on depositor and borrower behavior. The results of our event study show that RS has significant positive effects on deposits and investments and a significant negative effect on non-performing loans. These findings remain robust to the addition of control variables.
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Introduction
Legislation regarding bank regulation and supervision (RS) is a crucial formal institution for banking sector prudence. The extent of transparency, restrictiveness and the coverage of bank laws helps predict the adverse selection and moral hazard risks the banking sector faces. This paper hypothesizes that RS affects banking sector performance mainly through three channels. First, it increases the deposit-to-GDP ratio by promoting depositors' trust in the banking sector. Second, it facilitates the banks' abilities to channel funds into efficient investment projects through effective balance-sheet management, background checks and monitoring. Third, through effective supervision, RS increases the ratio of loans returned to banks.
The positive relationship between trust and financial market development has been evidenced in the works of Guiso et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. (2001) . 1 We argue that RS helps build trust in the banking sector. In accordance, Allen and Gale (2007) and
De Haan and Shehzad (2010) argue that regulatory intensity reduces banking crises.
Based on survey-based measures of bank regulation and supervision, however, Barth et al. (2005) argue that regulatory and supervisory intensity reduces banking efficiency.
This paper uses the legal indices of RS provided by Neyapti and Dincer (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) to empirically investigate the effects of RS on banking sector performance. Based on an event study, we provide robust evidence that RS has significant positive effects on deposits and investment, and significant negative effects on non-performing loans. In what follows, Section 2 describes the data and methodology, Section 3 reports the estimation results and Section 4 concludes.
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2. Data and Methodology Neyapti and Dincer (2005) and Dincer and Neyapti (2008) in five-year lags with respect to RS eliminates the potential simultaneity problems. For twelve countries in the sample, the time dimension of data is two due to re-enactment of banking laws. Hence, depending on the model estimated, the number of observations ranges between 34 and 61. 3 To control for possible cross-sectional heterogeneity, the White-heteroskedasticity correction is applied to the error terms. DEPgdp is positively correlated with capital requirements (0.41), TDgdp is highly correlated with the legal provisions regarding supervision (0.36), indicating that the enforcement quality of banking laws improves depositor confidence in banks' activities.
Also as expected, regulations regarding reporting-recording requirements, supervision and ownership are all highly negatively correlated with NPLcr (-0.50, -0.51 and -0.38, respectively). While regulatory provisions on bank lending is positively associated with investment (0.27), it is interesting that legal provisions on both capital requirements and director-manager qualifications are negatively associated with investment (-0.37). The negative relation is even more prevalent with regards to deposit insurance (-0.62). The empirical investigation below indicates, however, this observation may pertain to specific structural circumstances. 
Empirical Evidence
Equations (1) to (3) present the basic models to investigate the relationships of deposits, investments and NPL with RS. The expected signs of the coefficient are reported below.
In Equation (1), Dep stands for either DEPgdp or TDgdp; Sgdp and CRgdp stand Dep = f (RS, CRgdp, Sgdp, rDep)
for the ratios of savings and total bank credits to GDP; and rDep is the real rate of interest on deposits. CRgdp controls for the level of financial market development.
Equation (2) models the relationship between RS and investment, where r is the real lending rate. As typical in investment regressions, GDPgr is used to control for the business cycles effects.
+ + -In Equation (3), R is expected to increase the moral hazard risk, and hence NPLcr, since the real value of borrowed funds decreases with inflation, which affects R positively.
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NPLcr= f (RS, GDPgr, R)
--+
The robustness of the above basic specifications are tested by including additional control variables.
As Table 2a shows, RS has significant positive effect on DEPgdp, which is, on average, lower in transition economies (TE) than others. The addition of CRgdp, however, makes the effect of RS insignificant, indicating that developed financial markets ae already associated with high trust in the banking sector, this reduces the marginal effect of formal insitutions. Generally speaking, where market mechanisms are reinforced with developed business norms, formal mechanisms may add little to trust. Table 2b also shows a significant, although weaker, effect of RS on time deposits, measured by TDgdp. RS becomes insignificant when CRgdp is added, although its significance recovers in the extended specification. The negative interaction term RS*TE reflects the inconsistency between formal institutions and norms in the initial stages of transition.
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5 Addional interaction variables and governance quality 6 are introduced into the model, but not reported since they are either insignificant or not robust. Table 3 shows that, along with GDPgr, RS is significantly positive in explaining investment, whereas r is negative as expected. In addition, investment is observed to be significantly lower in TEs than in the rest of the sample. These findings remain robust after the addition of various other variables such as CRgdp and inflation, which are insignificant and hence not reported here. In addition, while controlling for governance (the Freedom House Index: FI) leaves the findings for RS virtually unchanged, its coefficient is not robustly significant and hence regressions involving this term are not reported.
RS and Borrower Behavior
Does RS affect the ratio of credit not returned to banks? The answer to this question is affirmative based on the evidence provided in Table 4 that that shows that RS, governance (gov) 7 and R all have significant negative effects on NPL. While the interaction between gov and RS is not significant, RS is significant for all possible values of gov. 8 These results remain robust after the addition of CRgdp, which is not significant itself and also does not improve the fit of the regression; hence those results are not reported. In addition to the above robustness checks, we controlled for the decade dummies in estimating deposits and investments so as to account for possible shifts in deposit and investment behavior over time. Those dummies are usually insignificant and their addition does not improve the overall fit of the regressions. 
